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ABSTRACT 
This study examines whether the proposed acquisition announcement on 
methods of payment has an impact on the bidder's returns behaviour. The 
analysIs uses the event study technique. the naive model. a model that is 
based on the market model with constrained a = 0 and f3 = 1 to compute 
the abnormal returns and to evaluate the effects of the proposed acquisitIOn 
announcement on the bidder's returns. The study finds that Malaysian 
investors appear to he not in favour of cash-based acquisition to be done 
directly by the bidding company as shown by the significant negative results 
on the bidder's average residuals after the announcement date. The same 
goes for acquisition that targets private limited company. The insignificant 
results obtained on the announcement dale itself may give an Indication that 
such announcements do not really bring "surprisingly good news" to 
investors. However, the significant positive results of the bidder's average 
reSidual on acquisition by equity on and after the announcement. either to 
be done directly or on private limited takeover, may give an implication that 
the use of equity conveys favourable information about the bidding firms 
and are value relevant. 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini menguji sarna ada pengumuman ten tang cadangan 
pengambilalihan mengikut cara membayar mempunyai kesan terhadap 
kelakuan pulangan syarikat pembida. Teknik kajian peristiwa berasaskan 
model pasaran dengan konstren a = 0 dan f3 = 1 telah digunakan untuk 
mengira pulangan luar biasa dan menilai kesan pengumuman cadangan 
pengambilalihan itu ke atas kelakuan pulangan pembida. Kajian mendapati. 
pelabur di Malaysia pada amnya tidak berkenan dengan pengambilalihan 
secara langsung berasaskan tunai sebagaimana yang ditunjukklln oleh 
keputusan negatif yang signifikan keatas purata sisa pembida selepas tarikh 
pengumuman. Kesan yang sama ditunjukkan bagi pengambilalihan yang 
mensasarkan syarikat sendirian berhad. Pulangan luar biasa yang tidak 
signifikan pada hari pengumuman menunjukkan bahawa pengambilalihan 
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titink sebenamya membawa berita baik yang menggemparkan kepada pelabur. 
Walaubagaimanapun, hasil keputusan pulangan luar biasa yang positij dan 
signifikan keatas pengambilalihan secara ekuiti pada dan selepas hari 
pengumuman. sarna ada secara langsung atau pengambilalihan keatas 
syarikat sendirian berhad memberi petanda bahawa pengambilalihan me/alUl 
ekuiti membawa berita baik dan memberi kesan nilai kepada pembida. 
INTRODUCTION 
A persistent pattern in the literature on mergers is that target firms earned 
abnormal positive returns during the announcement period. Nevertheless, 
evidence on the bidder is not clear and in fact is contradictory. In reviewing 
the evidence on returns to acquiring firms over immediate bid announcement 
period, Jensen and Ruback (1983) draw the conclusion that the target firms' 
shareholders would benefit and bidding firms' shareholders do not lose. 
However, the findings by Travlos (1987) on the impact of methods of payment 
on both bidders and targets have great significance both for theory and 
practice. For the bidding firms, Travlos finds significant negative abnormal 
return when stock is used as the method of payment and only normal rates of 
return when their firms pay cash in a takeover. Bugeja and Walter (1995) find 
that Australian bidders that offer shares (cash) earn significantly positive 
(negative) abnormal returns over the period (-60, I) days. 
Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) compare the effects of means of 
payment in takeover for the United Kingdom as well as the United States. 
They find that acquired firm returns are higher for cash offers than for all 
equity offers both in the United States and in the United Kingdom. For the 
event month, the effects are stronger in the United Kingdom. For the period 
encompassing four months prior and one month after the event month, the 
effects are about the same in both countries. For bidders during the event 
month, all cash offers yield small positive abnormal returns that are 
statistically significant in the United States, but not in the United Kingdom. 
For the longer period of analysis covering months -4 to + 1, cash offers yield 
small positive abnormal returns both in the United States and the United 
Kingdom and have some statistical significance. All equity offers carry no 
statistical significance. 
Hirshleifer (1995) quoted four key factors that have been emphasized 
by theoretical research on the means of payment. He also noted that a 
stimulus to the theoretical research has been evidence of lower bidder and 
target returns for stock offers than for cash offers. The four key factors are 
as follows: 
(1) value of equity in limiting overpayment; 
(2) equity is cheaper for a bidder that is overvalued, or whose valuallon of 
the target is low, so the offer of cash instead signals high value or 
valuation; 
Me/hods of Payment 
(3) the use of equity to exploit the target's information; and 
(4) tax advantages of equity. 
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In the us, tax-free status depends on at least 50% of consideration being 
in the form of equity; many offers occur at or near 50%. 
Chang (1998) examines, amongst others, the bidding firm's stock pnce 
reactIOn at the announcement of a takeover proposal when the target firm IS 
privately held. He finds that on average, bidders offering common stock 
have positive abnormal returns, and bIdders offenng cash have a zero 
abnormal returns. 
PrIvate companies are typically controlled by a large shareholder who 
particIpates closely in management (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes & Shleifer 
1999). Bidders do not offer shares when they believe thelT shares are 
undervalued and targets only accept cash when their private assessment of 
their own share value IS less than the offer. 
The takeover, merger and acquisition activities in Malaysia are quite 
dynamics. Their number, pattern and philosophy are mostly being influenced 
and shaped by the rapid development of the merger and acquisitions 
activities in the developed capital market around the world. However, 10 
Malaysia, the studies on this subject are mostly centred around the affected 
companies, share price behaviour in response to the acquisition announcement 
(Fauzias 1992; Fauzias 1993; Mansor 1994). Other related of the studies 
include the motives for company to engage in acquisition (Fauzias & Takiah 
1986). Accounting based measures performance on the target firms before 
and after the acquiSition exercise (Fauzias & Shamsubaridah 1995) and the 
prediction of takeover targets (Fauzias & Mariah 1998; Ruhani & Gupta 
2000) and bidders (Ruhani & Gupta 2000) based on past financial 
performance. 
Though most of the past studies examined and compared the effects of 
the acquisition announcements between those acquisitions that are to be 
settled by cash and those that are to be settled by shares on both the bidding 
and target firms' stock returns behaviour, this study attempts to explore 
further by looking at the effects of the proposed acquisition announcements 
on the bidder firm price behaviour that are to be settled by cash and by 
equity in two different perspectives. 
First, it looks into whether the manner in which the acquisition is to be 
made affects the bidder firms' returns behaviour. This is done by segregating 
the sample collected into two parts i.e. direct acquisition and indirect 
acquisition. Direct acquisition refers to an acquisition that involves the 
bidding company acquiring directly by itself whilst indirect acquisition is an 
acquisition that is made indirectly via the bidding company's subsidiary. 
Secondly, the study explores to see if the types of firms to be acquired could 
also contribute to shape the bidder firms returns behaviour. For this purpose, 
22 JurnaJ Pengurusan 25 
the firms of which acqulSltlons are targeted for in the same sample are 
divided into private limited and non-private limited companies. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The study takes into account all announcements of the proposed acquisition 
by cash and equity by the bidding firms that are listed on the Main Board 
of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) excluding firms that are 
classified under the financial sector as these firms are different in terms of 
their accountmg, financial characteristics and rules. The date considered as 
an "event" date is the date of the first announcement of a particular 
acquisition proposal as recorded in the first press release of takeover kept in 
the companies' file of the KLSE library. 
The bidding firm's daily stock returns were obtained from the KLSE for 
60 days before the proposed acquisition announcement date and 60 days 
after. The estimation period surrounding the event is further divided into 
pre-announcement period (-60, 0) and post announcement period (l, + 60). 
The sample period of the current study covers from the 1 January 1995 to 
31 December 2000. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the sample according to 
type of acquisition (direct or indirect), method of payment (cash or equity) 
and type of target firm (private or non-private). 
Within the sample period, a total of 167 proposed acquisition by cash 
and 53 by equity announcements have been identified to be suitable for the 
purpose of this study. Of the total acquisitions by cash, 119 announcements 
were involved in direct acquisition and 48 in indirect acquisitions. As for the 
types of target firms, irrespective of whether they are direct or indirect 
acquisition proposals, 136 targets were Identified as private limited companies 
and 31 were non-private limited companies. Of the total acquisitions by 
equity, 51 announcements were direct acquisition proposals and only two 
were indirect acquisition proposals. As for the types of target firms, 
irrespective of whether they were direct or indirect acquisition proposals, 43 
targets were private limited companies and 10 were non-private limited 
compames. 
TABLE 1. Breakdown of study sample according to type of acquisition, method 
of payment and type of target firm 
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The non-private limited companies in this analysis include listed and 
unlisted public companies, and foreign companies. The criteria imposed on 
the sample selected are as follows: 
• Must be the first published announcement of the proposed acquisitions 
purely by cash or equity. Subsequent announcements on the same 
particular acquisition are not considered; 
• Does not take into account the end results of the proposal i.e. whether 
the proposed acquisition is successful or not; 
• The bidding companies must be listed on the Main Board of KLSE; and 
compames that are classified under financial sector are excluded. The 
listlOg will be provided upon request to author. 
• Excludes any concurrent event. 
(i) Measurement of Abnormal Returns 
The basic methodology of this study involves the use of the following one 
factor market model: 
R =a.+~.R +E 
1,1 , I m,t l.t 
where: 
R = the daily returns of either the bidding or the target firm i at time t and 
'.' it is calculated as follows: 
where: 




., = the daily returns at time t of the market index (m), in this case is the 
KLSE Composite Index; that is 
where: ml = the index of the KLSE on day t and ml• 1 is the index of the KLSE 
one day before t. 
a, = E(R,., ) - b, E(Rm,,) ; 
~. = covariance (R ,R ) I variance R ; and I 1,( m,l m,t 
E. = stochastic error term . 
... 
This model is assumed to satisfy the normal requirement of a linear 
regression model that is; 
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all £j,1 have a common constant and finite variance for 0'2, for all t ; 
error terms are serially independent; and 
the distribution of f;., is independent of the explanatory variables R
m
., 
For the purpose of this study, the data is analysed using NaIve Model 
that is based the Market Model with constrained a = 0 and ~ = I. Thls 
procedure follows Madden (1981) and implies that the market is in eqUilibrium 
and the systematic risk for all securities is the same. 
Fauzias (1993) in examining the effects of acquisitlOn announcement on 
the price behavlOur of the Malaysian bidders and target firms employs three 
(3) alternative models, One Factor Market Model and the CAPM Model both 
with estimated intercept unconstrained and constrained to zero. The study 
finds no obvious difference in the conclusions from using different models. 
An announcement is an "event". The purpose of the event period is to 
capture all the effects on stock price of the event. The NaIve Model method 
is the simplest method of measuring this event. The predicted return of a 
firm for a day in the event period is just the return on the market index; in 
this case KLSE Composite Index for that day. That is; 
R = R 1,1 m,t 
Thus, the abnormal return (residuals) of a firm in particular day in the event 
period can be calculated as 
ARI,! = Ri,t - Rm•j 
For each day in event time the residuals are averaged across firms to 
produce the average residual for that day, AR, and it is calculated as follows: 
Where, N is the number of firms in the sample which have abnormal 
returns in day t. By averaging across firms, the "noise" in stock returns 
could possibly be eliminated especially in larger sample thus providing 
better chance of accuracy 10 distinguishing the effect of an event. 
The next step is finding the cumulative average residual (CAR). The CAR 
represents the average total effect of the event across all firms over a 
specified time interval. It is calculated as follows: 
CAR = 
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(ii) Significance Test On Abnonnal Perfonnance 
The followmg t-statistic is employed to determine whether AR, differs 
significantly from zero for any event day. The test statistic is the ratio of the 
average residual to its estimated standard deviation (a statistics of this form 
is widely used in event studies, e.g. Masulis, 1980); 
t= 
where, the standard deviation s is estimated from tIme series of average 
residual. 
In the case for the estimation period of (-60, +60), the calculation is as 
follows: 
AAR is estimated as, 
AAR = 
Where: N = number of average residuals in the estimation period, 
AAR = average measure of average residuals in the estimation period 
The test statistic on the cumulative average residual is the ratio of the 
cumulative average residual to its standard deviation which is given by: 
where, (JCAR = (JAR vK and (JAR is the standard error of the daily return over 
the estimation period, and K is the number of days in the CAR statistic. 
FINDINGS 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the number of proposals for direct 
acquisition by cash as announced has been consistent in each year with an 
average of 20 proposals or 12% per annum over the total sample. As for the 
proposals of the indirect acquisition (makes indirectly via subsidiary) by 
cash, the number has not been very consistent with the highest of 13 
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proposals recorded in 1999 and the lowest of 2 recorded in 1995. In total, 
proposals for direct acquisitions by cash recorded an obviously higher 
number (199 or 71 % of the total) than the proposals for indirect acquisitions, 
which recorded 48 proposals or 29% for the whole sample period. The data 
above gives an early indication that where cash is concern, direct acquisition 
involving the bidding company itself is more popular in Malaysia, no matter 
whether the target is a private limited or otherwise, compared to the 
acquisitIOn that is made indirectly through the bidding company's subsidiary. 
From panel B of Table 2, the proposed direct acquisition by equity is 
seen dominating, recording 51 proposals or 96% from the total 53 for the 
period of 1995 to 2000. The highest number of proposals recorded for this 
type of acquisition was in 1995 with eighteen (18) proposals whilst the 
lowest was in 2000 with only three (3) proposals. 
By comparison, generally acquisition by cash is more popular than by 
equity acquisition proposals amongst the bidders with 167 proposals or 
75.9% favounng the fonner from the total of the proposed acquisition by 
cash and equity for the penod between 1995 to 2000. In addition, there is 
a clear indication that direct acquisition proposals have been the bidder's 
popular choice regardless of by cash or by equity types of acquisition. 
TABLE 2. Number of acquisition proposals by cash and eqUIty according 
to type of acquisition. 
Panel A: Type of acquiSitions by cash 
Year Direct Indirect Total 
1995 22(13%) 2(1%) 24(14%) 
1996 17(10%) 8(5%) 25(15%) 
1997 20(12%) 6(4%) 26(16%) 
1998 20(12%) 9(5%) 29(17%) 
1999 21(13%) 13(8%) 34(20%) 
2000 19(11%) 10(6%) 29(17%) 
Total 199(71%) 48(29%) 167(100%) 
Panel B: Type of acquisitions by equity 
Year Direct Indirect Total 
1995 18(34%) 0 18(34%) 
1996 9(17%) 0 9(17%) 
1997 7(13%) 1(2%) 8(15%) 
1998 7(13%) 0 7(13%) 
1999 7(13%) 0 7(13%) 
2000 3(6%) 1(2%) 4(8%) 
Total 51(96%) 2(4%) 53(100%) 
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Table 3 shows the types of tatget, between private limited and non-
private limited companies that have become the chOIce of the bidding 
company with regard to the proposed acquisitions by cash and by equity. On 
average, the number of the private limited companies used as target in the 
acquisition by cash proposals is far higher than the non-private limited 
companies that is, about 23 offers or 14% to five offers or 3% received 
respectively, over the total sample, per annum. The highest number of offers 
received by the pnvale limited company was recorded in 1999 with 29 
offers whilst the lowest was in 1996 with 18. In total over the sample period, 
the total offers received by the private companies is 136 or 81 % compared 
to non-private companies which only received 31 offers or 19% of the total. 
Similar to the trend of cash acquisition for the period 1995-2000, the 
proposed acquisition by equity also seem to be targeting mostly pnvate 
limited companies. The highest number of 18 proposals or 34% was 
recorded in 1995 while the lowest of four proposals was recorded in 2000. 
The data, in general, indicates that private limited company is more popular 
as the target of the Malaysian bidder compared to non-private limited 
company, no matter whether it is a direct or indirect type of acquisition. 
TABLE 3. Number of acquisition proposals by cash and equity according 
to the type of target ftnns 
Panel A: Type of acquisitions by cash 
Year Private Limited Non-Private Limited Total 
1995 22(13%) 2(1%) 24(14%) 
1996 18(11%) 7(4%) 25(15%) 
1997 22(13%) 4(2%) 26(16%) 
1998 25(15%) 4(2%) 29(17%) 
1999 29(17%) 5(3%) 34(20%) 
2000 20(12%) 9(5%) 29(17%) 
Total 136(81%) 31(19%) 167(100%) 
Panel B: Type of acquisitions by equity 
Year Private Limited Non-Private Limited Total 
1995 14(26%) 4(7%) 18(34%) 
1996 7(13%) 2(4%) 9(17%) 
1997 6(12%) 2(4%) 8(15%) 
1998 6(12%) 1(2%) 7(13%) 
1999 6(12%) 1(2%) 7(13%) 
2000 4(6%) 0 4(8%) 
Total 43(81%) 10(19%) 53(100%) 
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Bidder's Returns Behaviour on the Proposed Acquisitions by cash and 
Equity Based on the Overall Sample 
The summary of the significant results of the AR and CAR with regard to the 
bidder's returns behaviour on the proposed acquisitions by cash and equity 
announcement based on overall sample is shown in Table 4, The results on 
the CAR are plotted in graph form in Figure I. As a whole, the bidder's AR 
direction appears mixed and unclear throughout the sample period. 
Closer to the announcement date, the AR by cash recorded positIve 
values but not significant on day -2, -1 and on the announcement day but 
immediately turns negative significantly two days after announcement. The 
similar trend can be seen from other smaller estimation period of (-3~, +30). 
As for method of payment by equity, the AR recorded positive significant 
values on the day of announcement and immediately turns negatIve 
insignificantly two days after announcement. 
TABLE 4. Summary of the significant test results on the bidder's AR & CAR of 
overall acqUisitions by cash and equity 
OVERALL (167 acquisitions) FOR CASH 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR), CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60,+60), "",,=0. 300 (-60,+60), "CAR=O. 3OO"K 
Day AR Values Sig t Day 'CAR Values 'Sig t 
-49 0.671 2.236 None None None 
-21 0.651 2.17 
-14 0.724 2.412 
1 -0.718 -2.393 
2 -0.905 -3.016 
(-60,0), "AR=O. 313 (-60,0), "CAR=O. 313~K 
-49 0.671 2.142 None None None 
-21 0.651 2.079 
-16 -0.746 -2.383 
(0,+60), "AR=O. 280 
-0.718 -2.562 2-11 -1.282 to -2.045 to 
-2.521 - 3.180 
2 -0.905 -3.229 13-60 -2.347 to -2.025 to 
-5.025 -3.163 
25 -0.570 -2.033 
(-30,+30), "AR-O. 358 (-30,+30), "CAR-O. 358~K 
1 -0.718 -2.007 None None None 
2 -0.905 -2.530 
(continue) 
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TABLE 4 continue 
OVERALL (53 acqUlsitIons) FOR EQUITY 














(-60,+0), ",,;0. 5478 
-18 1.3214 2.412 
o 3.1052 5.668 
(0,+60), "AR;O. 6184 
o 3.105 5.021 
53 1.252 2.024 
(-30,+30), "AR;O. 6027 
-18 1.3214 2.193 
o 3.1052 5.1523 
(-60,+60), "CAR;O. 5211 "K 
Day *CAR Values *Sig t 
0-6 8.7044 2.0409 
-11.173 -2.7584 
o 10.7306 2.5079 
(0,+6 0), "CAR;Q. 6184"K 
0-3 2.5470 2.0594 
-3.6916 - 5.0215 
(-30,+3 0), "cAR;IO. 6027~K 
-18 - -14 4.4302 1.9642 
-4.9866 -2.2869 
-10 - -9 5.4185 1.9619 
-5.5524 -1.9641 
-4-11 6.5882 1.9889 
-12.3892 -3.6339 
13-17 8.2558 1.9957 
9.2861 -2.2718 
·The values shown range (if any) from Ihe lowest to the hIghest 
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As for the CAR for acquisition by cash, it is noted to have mostly 
positive values in the pre-announcement period and negative values in the 
post-announcement period. Despite that, no significant values recorded for 
the estimation periods based on (-60, +60) and (-60, 0) but the CAR appears 
negatively significant on most of the days after the announcement date when 
using esllmation period (0, +60). As for method of payment by eqUIty, the 
significant positive values are mostly on the announcement date except for 
-30 days to +30 days where it is mostly positive before the announcement 
period. Likewise, the post-announcement period records positive significant 
values for CAR continuously for one day until 17 days after the announcement. 
The significant positive values for cash III the pre-announcement period 
may indicate that the news could have leaked in the market. Whereas, an 
immediate turning i.e. one day after the announcement date may indicate 
that the Illvestors have over-reacted to the news. It is also fair to conclude 






FIGURE 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return of Overall AcquisItions by cash and 
equity 
that Malaysian investors generally do not favour cash-based acquisition as 
shown by significantly negative results on the bIdder's average residuals 
after the announcement date. 
The positive significant values of CAR for equity for one day until 17 
days after the announcement could give an implication that positive 
information concerning a forthcoming corporate takeover is considered 
'good' news for the shareholders of bidders. However, the overall results 
could be associated to types of acquisitIOns either direct or indirect 
acqUIsitions, and types of company at which the bidding company IS 
targeting for either private limited or non-private limited, could influence or 
shape the bidding company returns behaviour. 
Bidder's Returns Behaviour on the Proposed Direct Acquisition and the 
Proposed Indirect Acquisition 
<aJ The Proposed Direct Acquisition 
The significant values of the bidder's average residuals (AR) and cumulative 
average residuals (CAR) in response to the proposed direct acquisition by 
cash and equity announcements are summarised and shown 10 Table 5. 
Upon approaching the announcement date, the AR by cash recorded 
significant positive values on day -2 and insignificant positive returns on the 
announcement day. As for method of payment by equity, the AR recorded 
positive significant values on the announcement and immediately turns 
negative insignificantly two days after announcement. 
The bidder's CAR on direct acquisition by cash records mostly positive 
values in the pre announcement period but the trend reverses after the 
announcement date. As for method of payment by equity, CAR records 
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CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60.+60). "CA';()' 337"K 
Day ·CAR Values ·Sig t 
-60 -0.690 -2.045 
20-21 -5.978 -1.970 
-6.570 -1.984 
23-28 -6.186 -2.001 
-7.095 -2.256 
30-37 -6.440 -1.971 
-7.048 -2.156 
43-47 -7.063 -2.030 
-7.604 -2.200 
58 -7.325 -1.991 
(-60.0). "CAR-O. 324"K 
-60 -0.690 -2.129 
-59 -0.897 -1.957 
2 - 60 -1.698 -2.072 
- 6.846 -3.527 
DIRECT TAKEOVER BY EQUITY 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR). CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60.+60). "A'=O. 5211 (-60.+60). "CA';()' 5211"K 
Day AR Values Sig I Day ·CAR Values *Sig I 
-18 1.1832 2.2735 0-6 8.4036 1.9727 
-10.6996 -2.6110 
0 3.0129 5.7894 
43 1.0397 1.9977 
53 1.3153 2.5223 
(-60.+0). "",,;(). 5478 (-60.+ 0). "c .. ;(), 5478"K 
-18 1.1832 2.1694 o 10.0382 2.3566 
o 3.0129 5.5243 
(0.+60). "",,=0. 6184 (0.+6 0). "CAR=O. 6184"K 
-18 1.1832 2.2735 0-6 8.4036 1.9727 
o 3.013 4.904 0- 3 2.597 2.1138 
-3.674 -4.9045 
53 1.315 2.141 
• The values shown (if any) range from the lowest 10 the htghest 
3J 
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mostly insignificant values before the announcement and significant positive 
return on the announcement and after announcement. 
(b) The Proposed Indirect Acquisition 
The significant values of the bidder's AR and CAR with regard to the 
proposed indirect acquisition by cash announcements are summarised and 
shown in Table 6. 
Since the number of firms involved in the indirect acquIsitions by 
equity is only two, the analysis on the share price behaviour is not done. The 
analysis is only for acqUIsition by cash. 
TABLE 6. Summary of the significant test results on bidder's AR & CAR of 
indirect acquisitIOns 
INDIRECT ACQUISmON (49 ACQUISmONS) 
AVO. RESIDUALS (AR). CUM. AVO. RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60,+60), "AR = 0.511 (-60,+60), "CAR = 0.511vK 
Day AR Values Sig. t Day ·CAR Values *Sig. t 
None None None None None None 
(-60,0), "AR = 0.544 (-60,0), "CAR = 0.544'iK 
-37 1.275 2.344 None None None 
-14 1.315 2.417 
-13 1.238 2.275 
(0,+60), "AR = 0.472 (0,+60), "CAR = 0.472VK 
32 -1.139 -2.412 None None None 
37 1.198 2.538 
46 -1.258 -2.664 
*The values shown (if any) range from the lowest to the htghest 
The movement of the bidder's AR on indirect acquisition by cash is seen 
mixed and unclear prior to the announcement date. Closer to the announcement 
date, the AR records negative values on day -3, and -2 but turns positive on 
day -I and then back to the negative values on the announcement date (day 
0). The similar unclear trend is also seen after the announcement date. None 
of the AR however has recorded significant values at 5% level during this 
period. Based on the estimation period of (-60,0), the AR significant positive 
values are however seen to appear on day -37, -14 and -13, whilst for 
estimation period of (0, +60), the significant negative values emerge on day 
+32 and +46 but turns positively significant on day +37. 
The bidder's CAR records positive values as early as from day -37 up 
to day +60 (-60, +60 and -60, 0) but appear mixed under the estimation 
period of (0, +60) with negative values emerge in the first week after the 
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announcement date, then turns positive in the next 18 days before they 
become negative again on day +26 up to day +60. Despite that, none of the 
CAR has recorded significant values at 5% level during this period. 
Based on the significance test at 5% level, it appears that investors are 
reacting negatively to the proposed direct acquisition by cash announcement 
compared to the mdirect acquisition by cash though it is not as immediate 
as expected. 
This is proven by the consistency of the significant negative AR (-60, 
+60), (0, +60) and CAR (0, +60) values recorded under direct acquisition by 
cash as early as a day after the announcement date. 
As for the indirect acquisition by cash, the significant values of the 
bidder's AR only appear approximately between one month to two weeks 
prior to the announcement date (-60, 0). The bidder's CAR has not recorded 
any significant value at all within the stipulated estimation periods. 
The investors' unclear reaction over the bidder's proposal of the direct 
acquisition by cash prior to the announcement date may mdicate that the 
investors are undecided and probably they are taking a little longer time to 
study the full proposal before they make up their mind. The negative 
reaction shown by the investors in the post-announcement period could 
possibly be due to their worries over issues like over-pricing, the source of 
funding for the acquisition, or may be also due to more complicated issues 
of synergy or value-added which are not up to their expectation. 
The significant positive return on the announcement and after the 
announcement gives an indication that such announcement signals positive 
information concerning a forthcoming corporate takeover is considered 
• good' news for the shareholdings of bidding firm. 
The unclear and insignificant reaction from the investors with regard to 
the proposed indirect acquisition by cash before and after the announcement 
date on the other hand may show that, such a proposal to most investors 
could be "too small a deal to be bothered". This is being the fact that, 
subsidiary of a bidder company usually has limited financial capability and 
it is very unlikely that thIS subsidiary will engage in large-scale type of 
acquisitions that will give a significant impact to the whole group's 
performance. The scenario would definitely be different if the bidder 
company itself involves directly in such kind of a transaction. 
Bidder's Returns Behaviour on the Proposed Acquisition When the Target 
is a Private Limited Company and When the Target is a Non-Private Limited 
Company 
<aJ Private Limited Company as Target 
The significant results of the bidder's AR and CAR with regard to the 
proposed acquisition announcement by cash and equity when the target 
company is a private limited are summarised and shown in Table 7. 
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The bidder's AR on acquisition by cash appears mostly positive in the 
pre-announcement period and negative in the post-announcement period. 
Closer to the announcement date, the AR records insignificant positIve 
values on day -2, -I and on the announcement date. Immediately after the 
announcement, that is, on day +1 and day +2, the AR turns negative 
significantly before it becomes positive again on day +5 and day +6 and 
thereafter, the AR mostly records negative values up to day +60. The 
significant negative AR values at 5% level are noted to appear on day -60, 
-16, +1, +2, +25 and +32 (-60, +60), -16 (-60, 0) and +1, +2, +7, +25 and 
+32 (0, +60). On the other hand, the significant positive values are noted to 
appear on day -49, -39, -21 and -14 (-60, +60), (-60, 0). 
The bidder's AR on acquisition by eqlllty appears insignificant in the 
pre-announcement period and positive the post-announcement period. Closer 
TABLE 7. Summary of the test results on the bidder's AR & CAR of acquisItions 
by cash and equity when a private limIted company is used as a target 
ACQUISITIONS BY CASH (PRIVATE LIMITED AS TARGET) 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR), CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60,+60), "A'=O. 316 (-60,+60), "c .. =O. 337..JK 
Day AR Values Sig t Day ·CAR Values *Sig t 
-60 -0.634 -2.003 -60 -0.634 -2.003 
-49 0.649 2.051 -59 -0.887 -1.982 
-39 0.660 2.083 
-21 0.663 2.095 
-16 -0.905 -2.858 
-14 0.633 2.001 
1 -0.675 -2.133 
2 -0.903 -2.852 
25 -0.637 -2.011 
32 -0.634 -2.002 
(-60,0), " .. =0. 327 (-60,0), "CA.=O. 327~K 
-49 0.649 1.986 None None None 
-39 0.660 2.017 
-21 0.663 2.079 
-16 -0.905 -2.767 
(0,+60), " .. -0. 293 (0,+60), "CA.-O. 293..JK 
1 -0.675 -2.304 2-3 -1.410-1.473 -2.405-2.902 
2 -0.903 -3.080 5-11 -1.617-2.654 -1.986-3 .. 202 
7 -0.594 -2.027 13-60 -2.222-70.98 -1.957-3.599 
25 -0.637 -2.172 
32 -0.634 -2.162 
table continue 
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Acquisition s by equity (PRIVATE LIMITED AS TARGET) 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR). CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60.+60). "AR:O. 6525 













(-60.+0). ",,:0. 6893 
-18 1.4141 2.052 
o 3.7280 5.409 
(0.+60). "A':O. 7602 
o 3.7280 4.904 
53 2.0842 2.742 
(-60.+ 0). "CA':O. 6893"K 
o 13.2564 2.4624 
0-2 3.5280-4.1993 2.6796-4.9042 
• The values shown (if any) range from the lowest to the hIghest 
to the announcement date. the AR records significant positive values on day. 
-I and on the announcement date. Immediately after the announcement. that 
is on day +1 and day +2, the AR turns insignificantly before it becomes 
significant on day 53 after the announcement (-60, +60) and (0, +60). 
The CAR on acquisition by cash records negattve values from day -{i0 
up to day -37 and turns positive from day -38 to + I. The values are mostly 
negative thereafter up to day +60. The CAR significant negative i-values at 
5% levels however appear only on day -60 and -59 (-60, +60) and on most 
of days after the announcement date starting from day +2 up to day +60. The 
CAR on acquisition by equity records significant positive values on the day 
of announcement and until day 6 for (-60, +60) and until day 2 for (0. +60) 
after announcement 
(b) Non-Private Limited Company as Target 
The significant values of the bidder's AR and CAR in response to the 
proposed acquisition by cash and eqUIty announcements when the target is 
non-private limited company are summarised and shown in Table 8. 
The bidder's AR direction on acquisition by cash is seen uncertain 
throughout the estimation period. Closer to the announcement date, the AR 
values appear positive on day -3, -2, -1 and 0 but immediately turns negative 
after the announcement date as noted on day +1, +2, +3 and +5. None of the 
bidder's AR however appears to be significant at 5% level for the estimation 
period (-60. +60). The significant negative values however appear only on 
day -13 (-60, 0) but positive significant values appear on day -40, -14 and 
-1 (-60. 0), day +31, +37. +48 and +49 (0, +60). 
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TABLE 8. Summary of the significant test results on the bidder's AR & CAR of 
acquisitions by cash and equity when a non-private company is used as a target 
ACQUISITION BY CASH (NON-PRIVATE LIMITED AS TARGET ) 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR), CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60,+60), _A.=O. 538 (-60,+60), -<:A.=O. 538,,1K 
Day AR Values Sig t Day *Car Values *Sig t 
None None None None None None 
(-60,0), A'-O. 501 (-60,0), -<A.-O. 501 ~K 
-40 1.006 2.009 None None None 
-14 1.0135 2.266 
-13 -1.153 -2.301 
-I 1.088 2.171 
(0,+60), _A.=O' 569 (0,+60), -<:A'=O' 569,,1K 
31 1.138 2.000 None None None 
37 1.648 2.896 
48 1.536 2.700 
49 1.623 2.852 
ACQUISITIONS BY EQUITY (NON-PRIVATE LIMITED AS TARGET) 
AVG. RESIDUALS (AR), CUM. AVG RESIDUALS (CAR) 
(-60,+60), A.=0.95.3 (·60,+60), -<:A.=O. 9503,,1K 
Day AR Values Sig t Day ·Car Values *Sig t 
-15 1.8986 1.9980 None None None 
-10 2.9008 3.0527 
-8 -2.4943 -2.6249 
° 
1.91302 2.0132 
26 -2.2589 -2.3772 
34 2.4863 2.6165 
(-60,+0), _A.-O. 9748 (-60,+ 0), -<:A.-O. 9748~K 
-10 2.901 2.9758 
-8 -2.494 -2.5588 
° 1.9130 1.9625 
(0,+60), _A.=O. 9514 (0,+6 0), -<:A'=O' 6184,,1K 
° 1.9130 2.0108 0-3 1.9130 -3.8212 2.0075 -2.1236 
26 -2.2589 -2.3744 
34 2.4863 2.6134 
.. The values shown (if any) range from the lowest to the highest 
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The bidder's AR direction on acquisition by equity is also seen uncertain 
throughout the estimation period. Closer to the announcement date, the AR 
values record significant positive values on the day of announcement and 
continue to uncertain as significant negative values however appear only on 
day -13 (-60, 0) but positive significant values appear on day -40, -14 and 
-1 (-60, 0), day +31, +37, +48 and +49 (0, +60). 
The CAR on acquisItion by cash for all categones of estimation period 
have been mostly negatIve and appear as early as from day -58 up to day 
+60. None however records Significant values at 5% level of significance. 
The CAR for equity however records significant positive value until three 
days after announcement date. 
Using i-test at 5% significance level as a benchmark, it is obvious that 
the investors react negatively, especially after the announcement date, to the 
bidder's proposed acquisitIOn by cash when the target is private limited 
company compared to when the target is non-private limited (where in thIS 
case it includes public listed and foreign companies) as proven by the 
significant values recorded by its AR (-60,+60) and CAR (0, +60). There IS 
an unclear effect to bidder's AR and CAR, both at (-60, +60), with regard to 
the proposed acquisition when the target is non-pnvate limited companies. 
Although the AR on acquisition by eqUIty records uncertainty, the CAR gives 
an indication that such announcement gives positive information concemmg 
a forthcoming corporate takeover is considered 'good' news for the 
shareholders of bidding firms. 
The mixed but mostly insignificant investor's reaction prior to the 
announcement date of the acquisition when the target is private limited 
company may indicate that investors are taking a little longer time studying 
the full proposal and in trying to get more information about the target. 
Information about the private limited company usually is not readily or 
publicly available and it is more costly and difficult to obtain if compared 
to a public company's. 
The significant negative reaction shown by the investors to such 
proposal by cash especially after the announcement date could possibly be 
due to similar issues when a bidder proposes for direct acquisition. These 
issues include high premium to be paid to the target, the bidder's source of 
funding for the acquisition as well as the issue of synergistic value that can 
be derived from the acquisition. While the significant posItive reaction 
shown on proposals by equity could signal low valuation on targets or the 
use of equity could mitigate the adverse selection of overpayment as quoted 
by Hirshleifer (1995). 
The insignificant reaction from the investors pertaming to the proposed 
acquisition by cash and equity when the target is non-private limIted company 
is still not very clear and poses a question mark. 
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In most studies, the bidder's returns would react negatively to the 
acquisition by cash that involves listed company due to reasons like 
wmner's curse, lacks synergistic value, or too high premium paid to the 
target company, In this case, the insignificant and mIxed reactions method 
of payments by cash could be the result of the belief that the proposed 
acquisition is the acquisition of additional control of the non-private target 
which does not add value significantly to the bidder or benefits the bidders' 
shareholders, at least in the short term. 
In addition to that, the mIxture of listed! unlisted public company and 
foreign company as target in this category may be the main reasons for the 
inconclusive results. This is because each of them in that category has 
different characteristics, and investors may react differently depending on 
the characteristics of this target. 
The results obtained from both direct acquisitions by cash of which 
target are private limIted companies seem to have a similanty and give a 
quite a similar pattern. The same results also obtained from direct acquisitions 
by equity of which target are private limited companies. 
Overall Analysis on the Proposed Direct Acquisition, Indirect Acquisition, 
private and non-private 
Table 9 is a summary of the Bidder's significant AR of all scenarios (direct, 
indirect, private and non-private) and Table 10 is a summary of the Bidder's 
significant CAR of all scenarios. The results on the CAR of acquisitions by 
cash and equity are shown in graph form in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. 
Bidder, in general, IS found to produce significant positive AR during 
pre-announcement period when the proposed acquisition by cash is made 
directly or when the target is either a private or a non-private company. 
During the post-announcement period, bidding company however generally 
records significant negative AR in all categories except when the target of the 
proposed acquisition is non-private company. On the other hand, the bidder's 
CAR on overall sample of acquisition by cash, indirect acquisition or 
acquisition where the target is non-private, do not show any significant 
results, in the pre- and in the post-announcement periods. As for the direct 
acquisition or when the target is a private limIted company, the CAR appears 
negative in both periods. 
In general, the results on acquisition proposals by cash obtained from thIS 
analysis tend to differ with Jensen and Ruback's (1983) conclusion that 
bidding firms' shareholders do not lose from takeovers. Other study however, 
like Travlos (1987), obtain results similar with the current study where cash-
based bidder records insignificant returns around or on the announcement date 
Itself. However, the bIdder's insignificant AR or CAR results obtained from 
acquisitions involving cash have been encountered before (Chang 1998). 
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TABLE 9. Summary of the bidder's significant AR acquisition 
by cash and equity on all scenanos 
Estimation Period Direct Indirect Private Non-Private 
Pre-Announcement (by cash) 
(-60.+60) -ve None +ve None 
(-30.+30) 
(-60.0) -ve +ve +ve +ve 
On Announcement Date (by cash) 
(Day 0) None None None None 
Post-Announcement (by cash) 
(-60.+60) None None -ve None 
(-30.+30) 
(0.+60) -ve -ve -ve +ve 
Pre-Announcement (by equity) 
Estimation Period Direct Indirect Private Non-Pnvate 
(-60.+60) -ve NA +ve uncertain 
(-30.+30) 
(-60.0) -ve NA +ve uncertain 
On Announcement Date (by equity) 
(Day 0) +ve NA +ve +ve 
Post-Announcement (by eqUIty) 
(-60.+60) None NA -ve uncertain 
(-30.+30) 


















Direct acquisitions that target private limited company are most popular 
in Malaysia as revealed by preliminary findings. In the aspect of competition 
for corporate control. the popularity of private limited company as the 
choice in acquisition could be possibly due to the fact that private target is 
less competitive compared to other types of target in the market of corporate 
control and this is expected to affect the bidding company's returns from the 
takeover. Considering most of the targets in the sample of this study are 
private limited companies, it may suggest that most of the proposed 
acquisitions are consented proposals and therefore they are unlikely to 
portray the characteristics disciplinary bids. Consented proposals may lead 
to over pricing and this could subsequently affect the bidder's returns 
unfavourably. 
Private companies are typically controlled by large shareholders who 
participate closely in management (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes & Shleifer 
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TABLE 10. Summary of the bidder's sIgnificant CAR of acquisition by cash and 
equity on all scenarios for a sample period of 1995 -2000 
CAR Direct Indirect Private Non-Private Overal1 
Pre-Announcement (by cash) 
(-60,+60) -ve None -ve None None 
(-30,+30) None 
(-60,0) -ve None None None None 
On Announcement Date (by cash) 
(Day 0) None None None None None 
Post-Announcement (by cash) 
(-60,+60) -ve None None None None 
(-30,+30) None 
(0,+60) -ve None -ve None -ve 
Pre-Announcement (by equity) 
CAR Direct Indirect Private Non-Pnvate Overall 
(-60,+60) None NA None None None 
(-30,+30) None 
(-60,0) -ve NA None None None 
On Announcement Date (by equity) 
(Day 0) +ve NA +ve +ve +ve 
Post-Announcement (by equity) 
(-60,+60) +ve NA +ve None +ve 
(-30,+30) None 
(0,+60) +ve NA +ve +ve +ve 
8 
6 








-4 , u 
: ... - .. CARDA; 
, 







FIGURE 2. Graph of acquisItIons by cash on all scenanos 
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1999). The controlling stake held by the large shareholders in the private 
targets makes them well placed to receive and evaluate mformation on the 
value of the proposed merger. Their in-depth firm knowledge also better 
places them to evaluate the merits of the proposed merger. Bidders usually 
do not offer shares when they believe their shares are undervalued and 
targets only accept cash when their private assessment of theIr own share 
value is less than the offer. The latter seems to be the case and most obvious 
in the direct acquisition by cash whereby the bidder's AR and CAR record 
significantly negative values in the pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Such a situation also can be associated with the hubris phenomenon where 
the target is over valued as a result of the bidder's pride. 
In competitive environment, the target seems to have the edge over the 
bidder especially when it IS a cash deal. The higher valuation of the bidder 
over the target's true economic value could lead to the winner's curse 
phenomenon in takeover bids (Roll 1986). Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993), using the basis of value changes, indicate that when agency problems 
or mistakes are associated with takeover or acquisition, total gains are 
negative. Because gains to targets are positive, the returns to the acquirer or 
bidding firm would necessarily be negative. 
Agency problems may result from a conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders and debt-holders. The proposed acquisition by cash may be 
interpreted differently by shareholders if they evaluate the proposal based on 
the free cash flow theory perspective. The shareholders may prefer the 
acquisition to be made by borrowing as to maximize the firm's ability to 
attract funds from the capItal market. At the same time, the shareholders 
would have expected that the excess internal funds of the company are to be 
used in ways that could benefit them the most. Over the same issue, the 
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management team on the other hand may want to reserve the firm's ability 
to borrow for future Illvestments. This contlict may lead to the company not 
being able to run as it should be and the management team may think that 
they are being deprived from performing their task professionally. Investors 
would definitely react negatively if they sense such a contlict exists in an 
acquisition bid. 
The pre-takeover performance of the target could also be a contributing 
factor to the way the bidder's returns react to the announcement. Pastena and 
Ruland (1986) point out that a lot of acqlllred firms are financially distressed 
and that for these firms a merger or acquisition is the alternative to 
bankruptcy. Solvency also seems to be an important feature to predict 
takeover targets as confirmed by empirical research conducted by Clark and 
Ofek (1994) suggest that the too high leverage position of the target has 
significant negative impact on the acqlllrer's financial structure after the 
acqlllsition. This naturally, would be negatively translated into the bidder's 
prices as a reaction from the Illvestors. Though this could be one of the 
reasons for the bidder's returns to react negatively after the acquisition, 
further research is recommended to confirm on this argument especially in 
the Malaysian market scenario. 
While the acquisitions by cash as the method of payment have shown 
no significant abnormal returns, the acquisitions by equity have recorded the 
highest on the announcement date. This may suggest that KLSE is reasonably 
efficient in terms of the speed of informatIOn as revealed by the significant 
immediate declines of the bidder's CAR from the highest level reported on 
the announcement date. This is consistent with Keane (1985) who refers 
market efficiency to two aspects - the speed at which new information is 
impounded into security prices, and the quality or correctness (direction and 
magnitude) of the price adjustment in reflecting new information. Keane 
(1985) further suggests that if the market is deficient in terms of the speed 
and quality of its reaction, the informed and alert observer would have little 
difficulty III profiting from the situation. The Significant positive values on 
the announcement of acquisition by equity, in fact again may give an 
indication that such announcement gives positive information concerning a 
forthcoming corporate takeover IS considered 'good' news for the shareholders 
of bidding firms and are value relevant. It also signal low valuation on 
targets or the use of equity could ffiltigate the adverse selection of overpayment 
as quoted by Hirshleifer (1995). The CAR significant positive reactions on 
the acquisition by equity are also recorded for direct, private and non private 
on and after the announcement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above results, Malaysian investors generally appear not to be 
in favour of acquisition in which method of payment is purely cash, either 
it is to be done directly by the bidding company itself, or that the targets are 
private limited companies. But, they are in favour in acquisition of which 
the method of payment is purely equity to be done directly by the bidding 
company itself. The same goes for acqUIsition that targets private limited 
company. The significant pOSitive reactIon shown on proposals by eqUIty 
could signal low valuation on targets or the use of equity could mitigate the 
adverse selection of overpayment as quoted by Hirshleifer (1995). 
As a whole and if the results are to be based on the overall sample of 
the acquisitIOn by cash proposals, it is fair to conclude that Malaysian 
investors generally do not favour cash-based acquisition as shown by 
significantly negative results on the bidder's average residuals after the 
announcement date. The investors' negative reaction to such announcement 
may give an implication that there are agency problems and winner's curse 
phenomenon associated to the acquisition apart from its method of payment. 
The bidder's failure to convince the investors that the proposed acquisition 
by cash could generate positive gains, be It in the form of synergistiC value 
or in the form of economic value, could possibly is the other reason for the 
investor's negative reactIons. However, the significant positive results on the 
bidder's average residuals on acquiSitions by equity after the announcement 
may give an implication that the use of equity conveys favourable information 
about the bidding firms. 
The insignificant results obtain on the announcement date on acquisition 
by cash itself may give an indication that such announcement do not really 
bring "surprisingly good news" to investors, possibly due to the "proposal" 
nature of the announcement or that the information about the acquisition has 
been leaked into the market long before the announcement. However, the 
significant positive values on the announcement of acquisition by equity, in 
fact again may give an indication that such announcement gives pOSitive 
information concerning a forthcommg corporate takeover IS considered 
'good' news for the shareholders of bidding firms and are value relevant. 
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